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Abstract For descriptive and analytical reasons there is an understandable tendency to view 
political parties as homogenous. Yet it is widely known that most parties, particularly those that 
compete in single-member plurality systems, are effectively coalitions.  This paper explores 
support for the Reform Party of Canada in part to better understand the character of the current 
governing Conservative party of which it was a founding component.  We find a party that 
attracted two distinct kinds of supporters: radicals, for whom support reflected the appeal of 
Reform party policies, its leader and ideology, and protest voters for whom it was mainly an 
alternative to the then-governing Liberals.  These supporters were geographically concentrated, 
with the former in Western Canada, and the latter in Eastern Canada. Such diversity describes 
one of the central challenges confronting all parties operating in Canada’s single member 
plurality system: sustaining a coalition of supporters in which reasons for attachment to the party 
vary by region. As with previous governments, it helps to explain the peculiar political demands 
that confront the current Conservative government as it seeks to maintain this coalition. 
 
Keywords: political parties, Reform Party, Conservative Party, protest votes, regionalism ; 
populism 
 
Résumé: Pour des raisons descriptives et analytiques, on tend à percevoir les partis politiques 
comme des ensembles homogènes. Il est pourtant notoire que la plupart, surtout ceux qui 
compétitionnent dans des systèmes uninominaux où s'affrontent plusieurs partis, sont en fait 
des coalitions. Cet article explore l'appui du Parti Réformiste du Canada, en partie pour mieux 
comprendre les caractéristiques du Parti Conservateur actuellement au pouvoir, dont le Parti 
Réformiste fut une composante fondatrice. Nous sommes en présence d'un parti qui attira deux 
types distincts de partisans: des radicaux qui appuyaient le Parti Réformiste, son leader et son 
idéologie, et des électeurs qui cherchaient surtout une alternative au Parti Libéral alors au 
pouvoir. Ces deux types de partisans étaient concentrés régionalement, les premiers dans l'Ouest, 
les seconds dans l'Est du Canada. Cette diversité illustre un des défis majeurs auxquels sont 
confrontés tous les partis en lice dans le système canadien, uninominal à plusieurs partis: 
stabiliser une coalition de partisans pour lesquels les raisons de soutenir un parti varient selon la 
région. Comme pour les gouvernements antérieurs, cela contribue à expliquer les exigences 
politiques spécifiques auxquelles le présent gouvernement Conservateur est confronté alors qu'il 
vise à maintenir cette coalition. 
 
Mots-clés: partis politiques, Parti Réformiste, Parti Conservateur, vote de protestation, 
régionalisme ; populisme  
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Introduction 
 
 In a foundational analysis of 
Canadian partisan and electoral politics, 
Johnston and his co-authors (1992) map the 
distinctive ideological and regional 
coalitions that underpinned Canadian parties 
at the time of the 1988 federal election that 
so spectacularly collapsed in the subsequent 
1993 election. Such intra-party coalitional 
politics is common in parties operating in 
single member plurality electoral systems 
that usually deliver a substantial legislative 
premium to the largest electoral party. The 
drive to build a large enough party to win 
overcomes the appeal of ideological purity. 
The collapse of the then ruling 
Progressive Conservative (PC) party at the 
1993 election ran along the fault lines 
identified by Johnston and his colleagues, 
with the Reform Party of Canada soaking up 
much of the western support lost by the 
Tories and the Bloc Québécois (BQ) 
benefitting in Quebec. Though the remnants 
of the Progressive Conservative party were 
about the same electoral size as Reform, it 
managed to win only two seats compared to 
the 50 won by the latter. 
Reform went on to reshape party 
politics in Canada, helping to mould the 
Conservative Party that resulted from the 
2004 merger of its own successor party, the 
Canadian Alliance, and the older 
Progressive Conservative Party.  The new 
Conservatives have gone on to win three 
successive elections and arguably end 100 
years of Liberal Party electoral dominance.  
A decade later, discussions of the 
character of the current Conservative 
government emphasize the continuing 
strength of the populist Reform-Alliance 
impulse over that of the older Progressive 
Conservative Party. In a recent article 
discussing possible changes to cabinet, 
national affairs columnist Jeffrey Simpson 
noted that Defence Minister Peter McKay, 
once leader of the Progressive 
Conservatives, was ‘….the last Tory 
surrounded by the hard-line breed running 
the show’ (Simpson, 2013). While much is 
made of this distinction, there is a tendency 
to treat the Reform element itself as 
homogeneous (for example, see Belanger 
and Godbout, 2010). 
Yet the essential nature of this party 
that changed the face of Canadian politics is 
not settled. Flanagan (2007) speaks of 
Reform consisting of five parties. Archer 
and Ellis (1994) note the demographic and 
ideological distinctiveness of its activists 
compared with those of other parties and 
point to divisions in the beliefs of core 
Reform supporters. Applying Pinard’s 
(1971) theory of one-party-dominance, 
Belanger (2004) suggests that ideology, 
associated with policy voting, is less 
important to its rise than its role as a protest 
party, capturing general discontent and 
displacing the Progressive Conservative 
party. 
We know that minor parties in 
majoritarian electoral systems may play two 
distinct roles.  They may attract the 
disaffected who cast a negative, protest vote 
primarily as an expression of disdain for the 
major parties.  Or they may attract radical or 
policy voters who intend to elect 
representatives who in favouring policies 
ignored by current parties, wish to challenge 
political orthodoxy (Bowler and Denemark, 
2002; Dalton and Anderson, 2010).  In the 
Canadian case, we know that all parties 
experience marked regional variation in 
support, evidenced in Reform’s strength in 
Western Canada and weakness elsewhere. 
We use data from the 1997 Canadian 
Election Study (the last election in which 
Reform ran) to apply a model that allows us 
to identify the character of support for 
Reform along three dimensions: protest 
voting, radical or policy voting and regional 
voting. We seek to establish the extent to 
which Reform’s support was rooted in 
political disaffection, reflecting 
performance-based protests captured by 
economic fears and party leader support.  
Or, alternatively, we explore the degree to 
which Reform’s support reflected 
ideological concerns and therefore a more 
purposive positive vote by policy voters. 
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The first of these would reflect support 
grounded in Reform's role as a minor party 
alternative to the major-parties while the 
second would suggest the impact of a 
hitherto untapped, or lightly tapped, vein of 
more radical politics.  We map regional 
variation in the density of these two types of 
supporters to analyze the interaction 
between the regionalization of the vote in 
order to understand the character of political 
support post 1993. 
The results show Reform attracted 
both sorts of voters: protest voters drawn 
primarily from late-deciding, non-partisans 
disproportionately in the East and radical, 
ideologically motivated self-identifying 
partisans or policy voters heavily, but not 
solely, located in its Western heartland.  
This regional variation on key issues among 
Reform voters was central to its coalitional 
dynamics.  Policy partisans across the 
country held significantly stronger stances 
on key social attitudes than did their non-
partisan Reform voting counterparts.  These 
voters were concentrated in the West. 
Reform’s non-partisans in 1997 were late-
deciding protest voters - with a lighter 
attachment to its social and economic 
policies but concern for government probity 
– spread across the country, but 
concentrated in the East. In short, a sizeable 
mainly radical element heavily concentrated 
among its supporters in Western Canada and 
a smaller mainly protest component 
concentrated in the East. These differential 
concentrations of partisans and protesters 
point to a significant mediating role played 
by electoral rules in shaping not just 
elections but Canadian political parties 
(Cairns, 1968).  In the East where the 
concentration of Reform voters was low, 
Canada’s first-past-the-post system all but 
precluded the election of representatives to 
Ottawa, reducing the party to a vehicle for 
mainly symbolic protest voting. As 
Rosenstone et al. (1984) have shown, this 
type of support can be ephemeral – voters 
are not willing to repeatedly waste their 
votes for a hollow protest. Higher 
concentrations of support in the West 
secured parliamentary representation for the 
Reform Party and the more visible profile 
that accompanies official Opposition status.  
These supporters could rightfully regard 
their votes as purposive and part of an 
ongoing political movement of consequence.  
Reform’s regionalism, though perhaps 
originally the product of regionally specific 
concentrations of alternative social and 
political attitudes, was reinforced and 
sustained by Canada’s FPP electoral system 
and became central to the politics of the 
Conservative party after 2003. 
The Canadian case serves as an 
important reminder that political parties – 
particularly in single member plurality 
electoral systems – nearly always fulfill 
multiple representative roles. In particular, 
populist minor parties are often at once a 
vehicle for the expression of radical 
ideological issues or policy voting by deeply 
attached partisans, and also for frustration 
with traditional party alternatives among 
voters who feel no deep affinity for the party 
and its larger program; they are in this sense 
two parties in one.  
This analysis allows us to understand 
the character of the coalition built by the 
current Conservative government and its 
fault lines beyond that between its former 
Reform and Progressive Conservative 
voters.  The Reform component of the new 
Conservative party was itself comprised of 
two elements, those drawn by its capacity to 
generate new policies and those disaffected 
by the ‘Liberal’ and perhaps ‘PC’ way of 
doing politics.  The subsequent merger of 
the Reform and the Progressive 
Conservative parties brought into the new 
Conservative party voters whose ideological 
preferences were more closely aligned with 
those of late-deciding protest voters in 1997 
(see Bélanger and Godbout 2010). In this 
regard, the results of the Gomery 
Commission (2005; 2006) that indicated 
corrupt behaviour relating to the Liberal 
party while it was in office likely swelled 
the ranks of disaffected voters willing to 
support the Conservatives and encouraged it 
to keep issues of government probity high 
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on its election manifesto and policy agenda, 
matched with more traditional ideologically 
conservative concerns. 
From 2004 until now, particularly at a 
rhetorical level, government accountability 
along with clearly conservative policies on 
major issues such as the economy (taxation 
and spending), immigration, policing and 
the family have been key elements of the 
Conservative’s platform and policy agenda. 
The former address disaffected voters, the 
latter more policy oriented voters, although 
modified somewhat by the impact of the 
world financial crisis of 2008-9. The 
Conservative Party exhibits elements of the 
coalitional dynamics that underscored 
Reform’s rise to national prominence in 
1997.  Canada’s regionalism combined with 
its first-past-the-post electoral rules 
continues to play a vital role in these 
processes.   
 
The Rise of Reform 
 
The emergence of the Reform Party of 
Canada in the late 1980s gave expression to 
increasingly sharply felt social dislocation 
and political disaffection for which the 
traditional parties were viewed, especially in 
the West, as having no real response (see 
Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 107).  
Geographic variation in support is a constant 
of Canadian politics, regularly expressed 
since 1921 in the rise of regionally based 
minor parties (Bickerton, 1996, p. 497). 
Major parties bound by the need to forge 
electoral majorities in the two most 
populous and economically powerful 
provinces, Ontario and Quebec, struggled to 
accommodate these distinct agendas (see 
Carty, 1992: 578).  While reliance on federal 
support may have limited the willingness of 
voters in Atlantic Canada to challenge the 
status quo, a tradition of suspicion and 
resentment developed in the increasingly 
affluent West to the domination of national 
politics and parties of the priorities of 
Ontario and Quebec:  manufacture, 
multiculturalism and special accommodation 
of French-speaking Canadians (Nevitte, et 
al., 1998). 
This sense of exclusion was fuelled by 
the increasingly convergent programs of the 
Liberals and Conservatives on platforms 
often at odds with the sentiments of 
Westerners.  Across the 1980s and 1990s, 
the two major parties took turns presiding 
over a struggling Canadian economy and 
increasing levels of debt, while extending 
commitments to multiculturalism and the 
accommodation of minority claims for 
special benefits.  Western conservative 
voters in particular were alienated by this 
convergence and the actions of the 
Progressive Conservative government of 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.  Mulroney 
oversaw the expansion of bilingualism, 
immigration and multicultural programs 
(Flanagan, 1995, p. 40), while introducing a 
Goods and Services Tax (Gagnon and 
Tanguay, 1996, p. 115).  Western 
conservative discontent came to a head 
when the government awarded a major 
aerospace contract to Bombardier of 
Montreal despite receiving a technically 
superior bid from Bristol Aerospace in 
Winnipeg.  As McCormick summarizes:  
“The Conservative government 
notwithstanding, the West was clearly low 
on Ottawa’s priorities” (1991, p. 343).1 
With the failure of the New 
Democratic Party (NDP) to establish itself 
as a viable alternative to the two largest 
parties (Harrison, Johnston and Krahn, 
1996, p. 160), those disenfranchised by their 
opposition to these issues came to see the 
party system as broken (Gagnon and 
Tanguay, 1996, p. 107). The result was a 
marked erosion of both the popular 
confidence in the major parties (Barney, 
1997, pp. 577-81) and the perceived 
legitimacy of the federal government and its 
welfare state services (Laycock, 1994).  
Combined, these set the electoral stage for 
the emergence of a party premised on 
championing those concerns (Harrison, 
Johnston and Krahn, 1996, p. 163). 
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The Reform Party of Canada 
 
At its first Party Assembly in 1987, 
Reform fundamentally challenged the 
programmatic and electoral status quo 
(Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 128).  Its 
first policy platform called for the rejection 
of special status for Quebec, a reduction in 
the scope of the Canadian welfare state, an 
end to official bilingualism and the 
tightening of immigration (Nevitte, 1998, p. 
176).  Emphasizing the burden of claims on 
the federal budget and bureaucracy imposed 
by ‘special interest groups,’ leader Preston 
Manning argued Canada was suffering 
under the yoke of a ‘tyranny of the 
minorities’ that threatened both national 
unity and fiscal responsibility.  He called for 
a downsizing of the federal bureaucracy and 
the return of as many governmental duties as 
possible to the private realm (Barney, 1997) 
and local or provincial governments ‘closest 
to the problem and need’ (Manning, 1996; 
Archer and Ellis, 1994, discuss these issue 
attitudes amongst Reform Party activists). 
Consistent with a populist view of politics, 
Manning also promised to introduce citizen 
initiatives, parliamentary free votes, town 
hall meetings, and referendums to restore 
grassroots control over a federal political 
system that he believed had lost touch with 
its constituents. 
 Despite fielding 72 candidates in the 
1988 federal election Reform failed to win a 
seat.  But just months before the 1993 
federal election Reform was gifted an 
‘exquisite’ chance to ‘showcase its political 
agenda on a national stage’:  the 1992 
Charlottetown Accord constitutional 
referendum to consider the issue of special, 
distinct status for Quebec (Nevitte, et al., 
1998, p. 176).  By opposing what all other 
parties supported, Reform gained national 
exposure and cemented itself as the 
supporter of a distinct notion of national 
unity at odds with the politics of minorities 
embedded in the Accord.  Opposition to the 
Accord fit well with Reform’s populist 
egalitarianism and its opposition to special 
treatment for Quebec and aboriginal 
peoples. 
Reform managed this feat in part by 
refusing to run candidates in Quebec. Not 
having to accommodate the sentiments of 
Quebec’s voters allowed it to maintain its 
vigorous attack on special status for the 
province. All other parties confronted the 
difficult task of fashioning a sense of 
Canadian unity that included the mainly 
French-speaking and distinct province.  
Reform’s non-Quebec strategy also made 
the most of the plurality logic of Canada’s 
single-member-district electoral system.  As 
with many minor parties in Canada and 
elsewhere, Reform could build its electoral 
fortunes by outpolling national parties 
among regional concentrations of alienated 
voters (Nevitte, et al., 1998, p. 193). 
The 1993 election saw the governing 
Progressive Conservatives implode, gaining 
just 16 percent of the vote and losing 168 of 
their 170 seats, an unprecedented rejection 
of a governing party (Nevitte, et al., 1998, p. 
173; also see Carty, Cross and Young, 
2000). Reform won just 19 percent of the 
vote but in replacing the PCs as the plurality 
party in the west gained 52 seats (winning 
22 and 24 in Alberta and British Columbia 
respectively). The Bloc Quebecois, running 
only in Quebec with the goal of separation 
from Canada, won 14 percent of the vote 
and 54 seats.  The traditional left-wing 
minor party, the NDP, lost two-thirds of its 
vote and sank from 43 to 9 seats.  With just 
41 percent of the vote, the Liberals won 177 
seats and a clear majority, establishing a 
pattern that was to define Canadian politics 
for a decade. 
 The campaign for the 1997 federal 
election echoed many of the same themes as 
1993.  Manning and Reform continued to 
oppose special bilingualism and special 
status for Quebec, benefits for minority 
groups, and concern with changing moral 
standards and lifestyles choices of society. 
The federal government was characterized 
as both inefficient and out of touch with the 
average citizen (Gidengil, et al., 1999, pp. 
266-67). In the end, Reform retained its 
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share of the national vote (19.4 percent), 
sufficient to secure it 60 seats in the House 
of Commons, and the mantle of official 
Opposition to the returned Liberal 
government.  It did so in an election where 
regional differences were significant factors 
in both the patterns of votes and the issue 
appeals designed to win them.  The 
empirical analysis that follows explores 
these patterns in the 1997 Canadian federal 
election. 
 
Protest and Radical Sources of Populist 
Minor Party Support  
 
 Several Anglo-American and 
European democracies experienced the rise 
of new populist parties such as Reform 
around the turn of the 21
st
 Century 
(Canovan, 1999, p. 4; Sigurdson, 1994, p. 
257) as established parties faced challenges 
associated with rapid change (Barney, 1997; 
Betz, 1998, pp. 1-10; Kitschelt, 1997, 
chapters 8-9).  Electoral support for these 
parties has taken a variety of forms, but two 
have been pre-eminent in recent decades – 
one rooted in protest, the other in 
ideological or policy voting. 
 The first reflects the role of minor 
parties as residual catchments of short-term, 
performance-oriented disaffection 
(Duverger, 1954; Rosenstone, Behr and 
Lazarus, 1984, p. 15). Support of this type is 
not the product of voters’ ideological 
fervency as much as of their disdain for the 
major party alternatives, and likely to 
resemble the votes going to any minor party 
alternative to the incumbent party.  That is, 
short-term protest voting reflects voters’ 
disillusionment with major party 
performance and programmatic 
convergence. 
The second reflects the affirmation of 
a variety of unorthodox issue stances or 
policy radicalism that catch-all major parties 
cannot afford to embrace (see Kirchheimer, 
1966). Here, then, votes for populist parties 
can be expected to be distinct from those 
going to any other party, resulting in a 
nearly exclusive gain of votes from the party 
in government. That is, ideologically-
informed voting is dominated by party 
stalwarts and identifiers who are attracted by 
radical policy stances for which there is no 
equivalence among the other parties. 
 We begin by distinguishing between 
anti-major party protest votes and those cast 
by individuals who identify
2
 with the 
Reform Party’s radical policy stances, the 
former anticipated to be shared among the 
opposition parties, the latter uniquely 
associated with Reform.  The model 
includes measures for retrospective 
(Retrospective Finance) and prospective 
(Prospective Finance) estimations of the 
respondent’s household financial situation; a 
three-item political disaffection scale 
(Political Disaffection Scale) measuring 
perceptions of political parties as not caring 
for ordinary people (Parties Don’t Care), as 
not being needed in Canada (Parties Not 
Needed) and an item measuring satisfaction 
with the way democracy works in Canada 
(Canadian Democracy Works), as well as a 
separate item measuring perceptions of 
whether it makes a difference who is in 
power (Doesn’t Care Who Wins).  The 
model also includes approval/disapproval 
scales for each of the party’s leaders 
(Chretien, Charest, McDonough, Manning 
and Duceppe) and party identification terms 
for each party (LiberalID, ProgConID, 
NDPID, RefID and BlocQID). 
 It is Reform’s more radical policy 
prescriptions with respect to immigration 
and government  support for aboriginal 
peoples that most sharply distinguish it from 
the other parties in opposition. To tap these, 
the model includes a measure for 
individuals’ attitudes toward the level of 
Canadian immigration (More Immigration) 
and government spending for Aboriginal 
peoples (More Aboriginal Aid).  These 
attitudes are examined for variation in 
support for Reform’s message.  The 
influence of region in Reform voting is 
pursued across the “East/West”3 divide 
(EastWest) which contrasts Alberta and 
British Columbia against the rest of Canada; 
and across five regions (Regionz5) grouped 
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as Atlantic,
 4
 Ontario, Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, Yukon and Northwest 
Territories, and Alberta and British 
Columbia. 
Figure 1 captures the fact that in 1997 
Reform’s seats were secured 
overwhelmingly in British Columbia and 
Alberta, and its support in this region – in 
terms of both identifiers and voters as shown 
in Figure 1 – was double that of its next 
most supportive region, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba. 
 
Figure 1 
Reform Party Identification and Vote by Region, 1997 
 
 
 
 
 Source:  1997 CES.    
See variables Refvot97, Refid97 and Regionz5 in Appendix.Quebec is excluded in this table as Reform did 
not field candidates there and was not included in the vote and party identification survey items in that 
province. 
 
Our multivariate models also include 
controls for the effects of individuals’ most 
important demographic characteristics.  
Thus, the model includes items tapping the 
respondent’s gender (Female), age (Age), 
level of education (High Education) and 
union membership (Union Member). 
 Measures for various other social 
attitudinal appeals in Reform’s campaign 
used later in the analysis, include: 
Opposition to minor group special rights 
(Oppose Minority Rights); opposition to 
bilingualism (Oppose Bilingualism); support 
for grassroots solutions to national problems 
(Support Grass Roots); support for the 
notion that anyone can find work if they 
want to (Anyone Can Find Work); 
opposition to adapting moral behaviour to 
changed times (Oppose Moral Change); 
feeling aboriginal peoples have more 
influence than they should (Oppose 
Aboriginal Influence); feeling that racial 
minorities have more influence than they 
should (Oppose Minority Influence); feeling 
that welfare recipients have more influence 
than they should (Oppose Welfare 
Influence); feeling recent immigrants don’t 
want to fit (Immigrants Must Fit); 
agreement that the government wastes tax 
money (Government Wasteful); agreement 
that the government is run by crooks 
(Government Crooked); lack of confidence 
in the federal government (No Confidence: 
Federal Govt); and feeling less confidence 
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in the federal than in the provincial 
government (More Confidence in Prov’l 
Govt). 
 These measures allow us to examine 
the impact on the Reform vote of short-term, 
performance-oriented concerns associated 
with protest voting and deep-seated 
ideological attitudes linked to policy voting.  
These attitudes are examined for variability 
by region to help us to understand variation 
in Reform’s appeal across Canada and the 
coalitional dynamics that underpinned its 
development. 
 
Testing Protest and Policy Voting Effects 
 
Table 1 reports the results of 
multinomial logit models predicting House 
of Commons vote in the 1997 election.
 5
  
Each column reports the effects of the 
variables in predicting a vote choice 
between one of the opposition parties and 
the incumbent Liberal Party.  We use 
economic performance and political 
disaffection variables for identifying protest 
voters, and radical issue stances for 
capturing policy voters. Leadership effects 
are also considered as it has been argued 
they may play a role in encouraging voters 
to forego existing partisan allegiances to 
vote for a new party (see Tverdova, 2010 for 
an explanation).     In regard to protest 
voting, we see that those who felt their 
household economic situation had been 
made worse by the federal government’s 
policies were significantly more likely to 
vote for the Reform than the governing 
party.  However, Reform was not alone in 
realizing vote gain from the incumbent party 
on this issue, with the NDP also receiving a 
significantly higher share of votes as a result 
of this effect. 
 With respect to the prospective 
financial situation of the household, 
however, the pattern runs counter to the 
secular appeal of minor parties on the first 
measure.  Reform was the sole significant 
beneficiary of vote gain from the Liberals 
for respondents who anticipated worse 
economic prospects.  Reform’s critique of 
the government’s economic program and 
highlighting of economic concerns had 
considerable, and exclusive, sting.  Others 
have noted that economic evaluations of this 
kind were one of the ‘deeper fault lines’ of 
the election and that they varied by region 
(Gidengil, et al., 1999, p. 262).  
Protest voting associated with political 
disaffection benefitted Reform as well the 
Progressive Conservatives and the NDP.   
Voters who felt the political parties and 
government had become unresponsive were 
focused on finding an alternative to the 
Liberals – only the Bloc Quebecois’s 
electoral fortunes being insignificantly 
affected by this issue.  A second factor 
associated with political disaffection, 
whether or not it is important who is in 
power, prompted no significant effects on 
vote choice for any party.  A regionally 
distinct pattern of sensitivity to this issue 
likely explains its lack of overall importance 
across the nation. Those in the East may 
have felt disaffected by not believing there 
was any real alternative between the parties 
(especially since Reform had little chance to 
win seats).  Those in the West may have felt 
disillusionment with other parties, but felt 
Reform was a clear and viable alternative 
with a realistic chance of securing a majority 
of the seats in the West. Quebeckers, 
similarly, had a clear regional alternative to 
the Liberals.  
 Reform then was a beneficiary of 
those issues associated with performance-
based protest voting.  But, these gains, 
except for those generated by prospective 
economic concerns, were shared with other 
parties in opposition.  These patterns are 
consistent with our expectation that populist 
parties, despite their high profile 
unorthodoxy, attract votes on performance-
oriented issues in ways and on themes that 
are essentially indistinguishable from their 
more orthodox counterparts in opposition.  
In this attitudinal dimension, at least, 
Reform was anything but a radical 
alternative. 
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Table 1.      1997 Canadian House of Commons Vote:  All of Canada  
Multinomial Logistic Regression:  Liberals are Reference Group 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Prog Con/ 
Liberals 
NDP/ 
Liberals 
Bloc Q/ 
Liberals 
Reform/ 
Liberals 
     
More Aboriginal Aid .002 .26 -.78* -.38** 
 .18 .21 .43 .20 
More Immigration .20 -.07 -.51 .30 
 .19 .24 .53 .22 
Doesn’t Care Who Wins .11 -.13 .36 .22 
 .13 .15 .28 .14 
Political Disaffection Scale .30** .46** -.11 .29* 
 .15 .17 .33 .17 
Retrospective Finance -.22 .65** .11 .46* 
 .24 .30 .60 .28 
Prospective Finance -.05 -.06 .47 .37** 
 .20 .23 .50 .22 
Leader Eval’n:  McDonough .05 .72** .14 -.09 
 .06 .08 .14 .07 
Leader Evaluation:  Chretien -.59** -.49** -.49** -.35** 
 .06 .07 .12 .07 
Leader Evaluation: Charest .55** .01 .006 -.03 
 .07 .07 .14 .07 
Leader Evaluation:  Manning -.10* -.13* -.75** .64** 
 .06 .07 .15 .06 
Leader Evaluation:  Duceppe -.03 -.25** .88** -.29** 
 .07 .09 .15 .08 
Female -.05 .58** -1.49** -.11 
 .24 .30 .61 .29 
High Education -.13 -.40 .91 -.57** 
 .27 .34 .68 .30 
Union Member -.006 .60** -.36 .34 
 .26 .30 .60 .29 
Age .004 .00004 -.02 .004 
 .008 .01 .02 .01 
NDP ID -.34 2.01** -1.89 .47 
 .75 .51 1.60 .64 
Liberal ID -1.17** -.96** -.40 -1.04** 
 .32 .35 .77 .36 
ProgCon ID 1.52** -.52 .10 .58 
 .36 .56 1.02 .41 
Reform ID 1.65 ----- ----- 4.21** 
 1.32 ----- ----- 1.08 
BlocQ ID .67 ----- 3.90** ----- 
 .86 ----- .93 ----- 
Constant -.42 -2.79** -.22 -2.46** 
 1.07 1.23 2.43 1.22 
 
n=1055     Pseudo R
2 
= .61 
Source:  1997 Canadian Election Study.  See Appendix for details on all variables. 
Figures in table are regression coefficients and, on line below, standard errors. 
* Significant at .10 level.     ** Significant at .05 level. 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 3-26 
 
12 
 
 Contrary to expectations, Reform’s 
more radical appeals on the issues of 
opposition to aboriginal aid and opposition 
to increases in immigration levels did not 
neatly garner it exclusive support.  Though 
opposition to aboriginal aid significantly 
drew votes from the Liberals to Reform, it 
did as well to the new minor party, the 
Bloc Quebecois.  At the same time, the 
immigration issue insignificantly affected 
the likelihood of vote draw from the 
Liberals to any of the opposition parties.  
This may reflect the fact, as shown in other 
research, that Reform stalwarts were not 
incensed about immigration numbers, per 
se, but about their unwillingness to ‘fit in’ 
to the larger Canadian culture (see Archer 
and Ellis, 1994, p. 297). All told, while the 
results in Table 1 suggest that Reform was 
not a unique electoral beneficiary of these 
radical issue appeals, the pattern of vote 
draw toward the two minor parties is 
consistent with the expectation that they, 
alone, could affirm the radical policy 
stances to attract votes on those issues. 
 A third vote choice calculus 
evident in Table 1 is the role of leader 
evaluations.  While Preston Manning was 
not widely regarded as a charismatic 
leader, Reform party candidates tended not 
to be known.  Manning by default was the 
party for many voters (Sigurdson, 1994, p. 
276).  There was a clear cut regional effect 
for Manning’s evaluations, with Ontarians 
in particular not taking to him while 
Westerners did (Gidengil, et al., 1999, p. 
267).  Overall, the effects for evaluations 
of Reform’s leader are as anticipated:  
positive evaluations of Preston Manning 
resulted in a significantly higher likelihood 
of voting Reform over the Liberals – a 
beneficial effect that is uniquely realized 
by Reform.   
The other leaders’ evaluations show 
that negative perceptions of the Liberal 
leader and Prime Minster, Jean Chretien, 
prompted vote drain from the Liberals to 
any of the opposition parties.  Unlike 
Manning’s exclusive effect on Reform 
support, positive evaluations of the New 
Democrat Alexa McDonough and the Tory 
Jean Charest were associated with support 
for three of four opposition parties, the 
exception being Reform, suggesting it was 
seen differently by voters. Clearly, in the 
shadow of the Progressive Conservative’s 
1993 annihilation, and the dramatic losses 
of support for the NDP at the same time, 
no party or leader would seem to have 
carried the mantle of opposition in the 
1997 election. 
In summary, the patterns in Table 1, 
as expected, point to Reform playing a 
non-exclusive role in terms of attracting 
votes from the incumbents on 
(retrospective) economic evaluations and 
attitudes involving political disaffection.  
However, with respect to the two 
ideological issues, aid to Aboriginal 
minorities and immigration levels, the 
anticipated exclusivity of vote draw 
toward Reform failed to materialize.  
Leadership effects were complex and 
multi-directional, suggesting no leader 
managed to drive the overall vote toward 
his or her party.  Given the significance of 
regional distinctiveness in 1997 voting 
(Gidengil, 1999, pp. 247-248) and the 
variety of issues that Reform trumpeted 
during the campaign, there would seem to 
be analytic justification in both broadening 
the range of issues under assessment and 
examining those issue orientations by 
region and party.  
 
A Regional Analysis of Policy Voting for 
Reform 
 
Many studies have noted the 
importance of regional variation in 
Canadian politics and the East/West 
distinction in issue and vote patterns in the 
1997 election in particular.  Gidengil, et al. 
(1999), for example, argue that regional 
differences in the 1997 election are not 
attributable to distinctions in voters’ socio-
economic backgrounds.  Rather, they 
reflect fundamentally different attitudes in 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 3-26 
 
13 
 
different regions of the country.  It is not 
simply that the residents of different 
regions have different beliefs or differ in 
their political judgments, important as 
these differences are.  The impact of 
region is both more subtle and more 
profound.  It lies in differences in the 
political agenda from one region of the 
country to another.  This is particularly 
clear in the results for issue-positions and 
economic perceptions (Gidengil, 1999, p. 
271). 
Table 2 allows us to explore the 
exclusivity of policy effects for Reform 
voting for the key variables found in Table 
1.  These are presented as pairs of mean 
scores:  for those voting Reform and for 
those who voted for any other party.  
Fifteen alternative social attitudes and 
issues are also reported as a way to expand 
the consideration of those factors 
responsible for Reform party support. 
They are presented for the whole of 
Canada (column 1), for those living in 
Alberta/British Columbia (column 3), and 
those living outside of Alberta/British 
Columbia (column 2).  This allows us to 
identify if there are uniquely Western 
attitudinal orientations, or if there are 
significant differences in the strength of 
those attitudes for Reform voters in 
different regions. 
Evident in these results are two 
important patterns.  First, Reform voters 
hold significantly more conservative 
positions on virtually all of these social 
attitudes and issues than do voters for the 
combined other parties.  Second, these 
results show that these attitudes are 
equally sharply held by Reform voters in 
the East as well as the West.  In virtually 
all cases, mean scores for these social 
attitudinal measures are essentially 
comparable, whether for Canada as a 
whole, for those living in Alberta/BC, or 
for those living outside of Alberta/BC.  
Only three issues (prospective economic 
evaluations; feeling it is not important who 
is in power; and feeling government is run 
by crooks) have scores that vary 
appreciably by region.  The patterns in 
Table 2, then, provide support for 
Reform’s distinctiveness as being the 
result of its voters holding significantly 
more conservative attitudes than other 
voters – but those patterns cannot be seen 
as unique to the West. 
 
Protest and Policy Voting Partisan and 
Non-Partisan Reform Voters 
 
Table 3 reports the percent of the Canadian 
Election Survey (CES) respondents who 
identified themselves as Reform partisans, 
the proportion in the campaign-period 
survey who said they intended to vote for 
Reform, and the proportion of post-
election respondents who said they 
ultimately voted Reform.  Two important 
patterns are apparent.  First, only 7.2% 
identified with the Reform Party, while 
20% ultimately voted Reform. Second, 
half of Reform’s votes came from non-
identifiers with the party – late-deciders 
who made their vote choice during the 
final few weeks of the campaign, since the 
campaign-period survey shows only 11% 
intending to vote Reform.
6
   
 Table 3 reveals Reform’s voters are 
a combination of partisans (those with a 
self-identified affinity for the party) and 
those who, in the waning days of the 
campaign, decided to cast their votes for 
Reform.  It is a distinction that has a 
decidedly regional basis.   
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 3-26 
 
14 
 
 
Table 2.      Social Attitudes Mean Scores by Reform/not Reform Vote 
For Canada, non-Alberta/British Columbia, and Alberta/British Columbia 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Party Voted 
For: 
Reform/Other 
Means 
Canada 
Means 
Non-Alberta/ 
BC 
Means  
Alberta/BC 
Basic Logit Model     
Political Disaffection Scale Reform .29** .28** .30** 
     Other Party -.21 -.19 -.31 
More Aboriginal Aid Reform 1.67** 1.63** 1.70** 
      Other Party 1.98 1.98 2.04 
More Immigration Reform 1.50** 1.47** 1.51** 
    Other Party 1.69 1.67 1.80 
Retrospective Finance Reform 2.33** 2.29** 2.36** 
      Other Party 2.13 2.14 2.10 
Prospective Finance Reform 1.93** 1.95 1.91* 
      Other Party 1.86 1.86 1.81 
Doesn’t Care Who Wins Reform 2.53 2.70** 2.41 
      Other Party 2.44 2.46 2.31 
Alternative Social Attitudes     
Oppose Minority Rights Reform 3.45** 3.55** 3.38** 
    Other Party 3.05 3.03 3.15 
Oppose Bilingualism Reform 3.53** 3.53** 3.54** 
     Other Party 2.57 2.54 2.74 
Support Grassroots Reform 3.07** 3.14** 3.03** 
      Other Party 2.78 2.81 2.64 
Anyone Can Find Work Reform 2.94** 3.01** 2.88** 
      Other Party 2.75 2.76 2.70 
Oppose Moral Change Reform 2.91** 3.08** 2.78** 
      Other Party 2.46 2.43 2.62 
Oppose Aboriginal Influence Reform .72** .65** .78** 
     Other Party -.18 -.12 -.47 
Oppose Minority Influence Reform 1.50** 1.49** 1.51** 
 Other Party -.03 -.03 -.03 
Oppose Welfare Influence Reform .65** .73** .58** 
     Other Party -.08 -.001 -.52 
Government Wasteful Reform 2.80** 2.80** 2.79** 
      Other Party 2.64 2.67 2.51 
Government Crooked Reform 2.46** 2.43 2.48** 
      Other Party 2.37 2.38 2.27 
Immigrants Must Fit Reform 3.00** 3.06** 2.96** 
     Other Party 2.68 2.71 2.52 
No Confidence: Federal Govt Reform 2.87** 2.88** 2.87** 
      Other Party 2.55 2.55 2.51 
More Confidence:  Prov’l Govt Reform .30** .20** .37** 
      Other Party -.05 -.06 -.02 
 
Source:  1997 Canadian Election Study.  See Appendix for details on all variables.  Figures in 
table are means.  Means score significance levels derive from Levene’s tests for equality of 
means. 
*  Significant at .10 level.     **  Significant at .05 level. 
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Table 3 
1997 House of Commons Vote and Seats, Party Identification, Intended Vote and Vote 
 
 
Party Official 
Results:  
Vote 
Percent
1a
 
Official 
Results:  
Seats Won
1b
 
’97 CES 
Survey: 
Party ID: 
Percent
2
 
’97 CES 
Survey:  
Intended 
Vote:  
Percent
3
 
’97 CES 
Survey:  
Vote: 
Percent
4
 
Liberal 38.4 155 27.3 21.6 31.3 
Prog Con 18.9 20 13.8 11.4 16.0 
NDP 11.0 21 7.3 7.3 10.7 
Reform 19.4 60 7.2 11.1 20.0 
Bloc Q 10.7 44 7.3 6.4 9.1 
Other 1.6 1 1.0 1.6 1.7 
Total 100.0 301    
 
1a and 1b 
  Source:  1997 Canadian Federal Election Results.  Source:  Elections Canada.  See 
website detail provided by the University of British Columbia:  http://esm.ubc.ca/CA97/results 
2
  Source:  1997 CES.  Campaign Period Survey (CPS) variable:  CPSK1.  (Note:  The deletion of 
those with no ID, and those who refused or replied “don’t know” means percentages do not tally 
to 100%) 
3
  Source:  1997 CES.  Campaign Period Survey (CPS) variable:  CPSA4. (Note:  The deletion of 
those who would not vote, and those who refused or replied “don’t know/undecided” means 
percentages do not tally to 100%) 
4
  Source:  1997 CES.  Post Election Survey (PES) variable:  PESA4. (Note:  The deletion of those 
who did not vote, and those who refused or replied “don’t know” means percentages do not tally 
to 100%) 
 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of 
Reform’s partisan loyalists and non-
partisan supporters who decided their 
votes “early” (before the campaign had 
begun) and “late” (during the campaign 
itself). Reform’s party identifiers were 
party loyalists who were much more likely 
to have decided their vote before the 
campaign (74%) than during it (26%).  
Their vote was not shaped last-minute 
electioneering, including the campaign’s 
debates, advertising and news coverage.  
At the same time, Reform’s non-partisan 
voters were far more likely to have 
decided their votes during the final 
campaign period (59.3%) than before it 
(40.7%) – indicative of reliance on 
election-specific factors in deciding their 
votes, and not an ideological commitment 
to Reform’s overall platform.   
Small survey numbers makes 
impossible the analysis of vote decision-
making timing across the various regions. 
Yet in tandem with Figure 1, these results 
confirm that Reform’s partisan and non-
partisan support varied significantly across 
Canada’s regions in 1997 with the 
attendant implications for protest and 
policy support as well as voters’ 
expectations regarding the likelihood of 
successfully electing representatives to 
send to Ottawa. 
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Figure 2 
Reform Party Identification and Vote Decision Timing, 
amongst Reform Voters, 1997 
 
Source:  1997 CES 
See variables Refvot97, Refid97 and Erlyvot1 in Appendix. 
 
 While Figure 1 makes clear that a 
majority of Reform’s Western voters were 
identifiers, the ranks of Reform’s voters in 
the East were dominated by non-identifying 
late deciders.  These late deciders are 
unlikely to be voters who affirmed or 
changed their opinions on key issues – as 
research by Blais, et al. (no date) has shown.  
Rather, they are most likely to be 
performance-oriented voters who, in the 
end, cast a Reform vote because they felt 
disdain for the major party alternatives or, 
perhaps cast their votes for Reform to 
prevent the Bloc Quebecois from becoming 
the official Opposition (Gidengil, et al., 
1999, p. 251). 
 If true, we would expect distinct 
issue orientations and intensity for those 
voters who identify with the Reform party 
and those who do not.  In particular, non-
identifying Reform voters are anticipated to 
hold higher scores on performance-oriented 
issues, while Reform partisans are expected 
to have the strongest scores on social issues 
associated with policy voting.  Table 4 
reports the mean scores for all the issues 
assessed in previous tables, for two groups 
of Reform voters:  those who identified with 
the party and those who did not.   
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Table 4.      Social Attitudes Mean Scores for Reform Voters 
by Reform/not-Reform Party ID 
 
Independent Variables 
 
Reform Party ID 
or Not 
Means 
 
Basic Logit Model   
Political Disaffection Scale Reform ID    .33 
     No Reform ID    .27 
More Aboriginal Aid Reform ID    .161 
      No Reform ID    .170 
More Immigration Reform ID    1.41** 
    No Reform ID    1.56 
Retrospective Finance Reform ID    2.37 
      No Reform ID    2.32 
Prospective Finance Reform ID    1.89 
      No Reform ID    1.95 
Doesn’t Care Who Wins Reform ID    2.21** 
      No Reform ID    2.76 
Alternative Social Attitudes   
Oppose Minority Rights Reform ID    3.48 
    No Reform ID    3.44 
Oppose Bilingualism Reform ID    3.59 
     No Reform ID    3.52 
Support Grassroots Reform ID    3.21** 
      No Reform ID    3.01 
Anyone Can Find Work Reform ID    2.99 
      No Reform ID    2.92 
Oppose Moral Change Reform ID    3.02* 
      No Reform ID    2.84 
Oppose Aboriginal Influence Reform ID    .93 
     No Reform ID    .59 
Oppose Minority Influence Reform ID    1.86** 
 No Reform ID    1.28 
Oppose Welfare Influence Reform ID    .97** 
     No Reform ID    .41 
Government Wasteful Reform ID    2.86** 
      No Reform ID    2.76 
Government Crooked Reform ID    2.51 
      No Reform ID    2.43 
Immigrants Must Fit Reform ID    3.15** 
     No Reform ID    2.92 
No Confidence: Federal Govt Reform ID    2.98** 
      No Reform ID    2.79 
More Confidence:  Prov’l Govt Reform ID    .39* 
      No Reform ID    .23 
 
Source:  1997 Canadian Election Study.  See Appendix for details on all 
variables. 
Figures in table are means; significance levels derive from Levene’s tests for 
equality of means. 
* Significant at .10 level.     ** Significant at .05 level. 
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The results show that Reform voting 
partisans and non-partisans do hold distinct 
issue orientations.  Party identifiers hold 
issue positions that are more conservative 
than their non-identifying counterparts on all 
social issues.  Nine of those differences are 
statistically significant.  In the area of 
economic evaluations and political 
disaffection, however, in no case do Reform 
identifiers have significantly different scores 
than their non-identifier counterparts, while 
on one issue (feeling it is not important who 
is in power) non-identifiers are significantly 
more disaffected than identifiers.  In short, 
Reform voters may be seen as comprised of 
two reasonably distinct groups who vary by 
their issue orientation and intensity. 
 The patterns in Table 4 suggest that 
many social issues in 1997 had become 
closely identified with Reform and its 
leader, Preston Manning, given the 
significant differences between the issue 
opinions of Reform voting partisans and 
those of Reform’s non-partisan voters.  The 
implications are two-fold:  First, Reform 
party identification strongly correlates with 
most of the radical social issues considered.  
Second, those issues are important 
predictors of Reform voting, but primarily 
through the ranks of party identifiers who, 
as we have seen, predominantly resided in 
Reform’s Western heartland.  Clearly, then, 
Reform’s electoral success in Alberta and 
British Columbia can at the very least be 
partly attributed to its ability to convey the 
politics of its radical policies to larger 
numbers of supporters who had come to 
identify with the party and its platform.  
Reform’s weaker showing in the East 
reflects its perception by the vast majority of 
its voters to be mainly a protest party 
unlikely to generate sufficient appeal to 
build majoritarian support. 
These different issues and the 
distinctive groups of voters who are drawn 
to them continue to have important 
implications for conservative politics in 
Canada.  Policy positions to do with 
government accountability and transparency 
that attract disaffected protest voters and 
more traditional conservative concerns such 
as crime, taxation, and immigration that 
attract ideological policy voters have been 
central to the platforms of the new 
Conservative party since the 2004 election 
(see Conservative Party Election Platforms 
2004 to 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 
As with all parties that pursue government 
in single member plurality electoral systems, 
the Reform Party of Canada relied for its 
success on a coalition of somewhat disparate 
sub-groups each seeking a means of 
expressing their political preferences. This 
dynamic reflects the relative bluntness with 
which majoritarian electoral systems address 
diversity in policy preferences, a frequent 
corollary of which is the build-up of unmet 
policy demands over time. This is 
particularly the case in Canada, where 
voters’ policy preferences are shaped by 
ethno-linguistic and regional diversity. 
Majoritarian and relatively inflexible 
electoral and parliamentary systems require 
parties to construct support bases across this 
diversity in their attempt to win government. 
In so doing, federal Canadian political 
parties face a steep gradient of integration as 
they attempt to synthesize policy diversity 
into a single political movement. 
 A central tenet of the Reform Party’s 
organizational ethos, articulated by its 
founding leader, Preston Manning, was the 
goal of becoming a major party. His 
willingness to disband the Reform Party in 
creating its first successor party, the 
Canadian Alliance, is evidence of this 
commitment. The integrative strategy 
required for success in this context led then 
to the founding of the modern Conservative 
Party via a merger of the Canadian Alliance 
with the older Progressive Conservative 
Party, aimed at broadening the appeal of this 
once overtly populist movement. Our 
analysis indicates that the first stage of this 
strategy saw Reform build a coalition of two 
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types of voters; policy voters, with relatively 
radical and unconventional policy views, 
and more orthodox non-ideological protest 
voters unhappy with the then major parties, 
the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives. 
The Canadian case is significant for 
conflating these two types of voters with 
regional variations – such that part of the 
explanation for Reform’s success in the 
West in 1997 was the larger number of 
voters who were attracted to, and remained 
bound to, the Reform party because of its 
unconventional stances on a variety of 
radical social issues.  This helps to explain 
why Reform voters’ issue stances were 
consistently sharper and more conservative 
than those for other parties’ voters and 
contributed to its success in the West when 
these issue orientations themselves did not 
vary appreciably by region.  These social 
issues played a significant role in prompting 
Reform votes because they were held 
disproportionately by its partisans, who 
predominated in the West.   
 While protest votes are worth as 
much as policy votes, insurgent parties are 
unlikely to break through and win seats 
unless they are able to convey a sufficiently 
vibrant set of issue appeals to challenge 
major party dominance.  Reform’s electoral 
strategies helped to assure the regional 
distinctiveness of both its supporters’ 
attitudes and its share of the vote and seats. 
Not content with minority party status, 
Manning and Reform tapped long-
simmering disdain for the country’s 
electoral centre and its unwillingness to pay 
attention to the West, and forged a radical 
set of ideological stances that played off of 
the other parties’ inability to assume sharp-
edged stances.  
The result was the fueling of both 
voter passions and a self-fulfilling dynamic 
in the West, where a latent majority was 
consolidated into winning margins. 
Reform’s exclusive opposition to the 
Charlottetown Accord was important in its 
self-promotion as a party distinctly different 
from politics as usual.  While it was critical 
in securing its majority-level support in the 
West, it was also significant in relegating it 
to a protest party thorn in the side in those 
regions where opposition to distinct status 
for Quebec was more limited.  After the 
1997 election (as with the 1993 election, in 
which Reform secured one seat in Ontario, 
and no others in Eastern provinces) the 
differential viability of Reform’s candidates 
in the West and East served to underscore 
Reform’s two regionally distinctive profiles.  
 In the East, Reform’s radical appeals 
appear to have fared less well, leaving the 
party more reliant on the protest voters 
disillusioned with the alternatives that are 
traditionally associated with minor parties. 
At the same time, because Reform had 
virtually no likelihood of securing seats in 
Eastern provinces, its role as a mere residual 
catchment of voters disenchanted with the 
major parties was self-fulfilling.  In the 
West, however, where dozens of candidates 
were all but certain to be sent to Ottawa to 
convey Reform’s policy demands, voters 
could embrace the party as a purposive, 
programmatic vehicle of their concerns.  
Reform then began a process which forged a 
‘major’ Western party and a ‘minor’ Eastern 
protest party into the Conservative Party that 
formed minority governments in 2006 and 
2008 and secured a majority in their own 
right in the 2011 Canadian federal election. 
The regionalizing impulse of FPP in a 
diverse country has been a key driver of 
partisan politics in Canada.  It has long been 
noted that Canadian political parties must 
manage the shocks that accompany the 
process of melding together disparate 
coalitions; they are often referred to as 
brokerage parties in part because of this 
demand (Carty, Cross and Young 2000). 
Internal coalitions are likely to be regionally 
based and consist of voters whose major 
interest is dispersed along at least two 
orthogonal electoral or policy dimensions, in 
this case protest and policy voters. This is 
the logically minimal condition under which 
a party might avoid deep contradictions and 
under which policy shocks among the 
coalition are of a type that may be absorbed 
using strategies such as offering policy wins 
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to each of the coalitional elements.  These 
findings confirm Cairns’ contention (1968) 
that melding regional impulses of this kind 
is perhaps the central task of national parties 
in Canada. 
 
_____ 
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Appendix 
Variable Codes, Scales and Measures 
 
Political measures 
Refvot97     A dummy variable (0, 1) for a Reform vote in the 1997 election:  1 = ‘Reform’; 0 
= ‘Other’; ‘Liberal’; ‘Progressive Conservatives’; ‘New Democratic Party’; or ‘Bloc 
Quebecois’ (original CES variable:  pesa4). 
Refid97     A dummy variable (0, 1) for Reform party identification in 1997:  1 = ‘Reform’; 0 
= ‘Liberal’; ‘Progressive Conservatives’; ‘New Democratic Party’; ‘Bloc Quebecois’; 
or  ‘Other’(original CES variable:  cpsk1). 
Erlyvot1     A dummy variable (0, 1) measuring the timing of respondents’ vote choice for 
Reform:  1 = ‘before the campaign’; 0 = ‘before the debates’; ‘during or after the 
debates’; ‘in the last two weeks of the campaign’; or ‘on Election Day’ (original CES 
variable:  pesa4c). 
Political Disaffection Scale     A 3-variable scale, derived from factor analysis scores, 
measuring political disaffection.  The three component variables are: 
Parties Don’t Care     A 5-value variable measuring the perception of political 
parties’ concern for ordinary people:  1 = ‘political parties in Canada care what 
ordinary people think’; 5 = ‘political parties in Canada don’t care what 
ordinary people think’  (original CES variable:  mbsi4). 
Parties Not Needed     A 5-value variable measuring the perception of parties 
as important for the Canadian political system:  1 = ‘political parties are 
necessary to make our political system work’; 5 = ‘political parties are not 
needed in Canada’  (original CES variable:  mbsi5). 
Canadian Democracy Works     A 4-value variable measuring satisfaction 
with ‘the way democracy works in Canada’:  1 = ‘very satisfied’; 4 = ‘not at 
all satisfied’  (original CES variable:  mbsi1). 
 
Factor analysis of 3 measures in the political disaffection scale 
 
A principle components factor analysis derived 1 factor, with factor scores: 
         Factor  1 
 
Parties Don’t Care  .75990 
Parties Not Needed  .73520 
Canadian Democracy Works .75121 
 
Care Who Wins     A 5-value variable measuring the perceived difference of who is in 
power:  1 = ‘it makes a difference who is in power’; ‘5 = “it doesn’t make a 
difference who is in power’ (original CES variable:  mbsI13). 
Chretien     An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Liberal Party leader, 
Jean Chretien:  0 = ‘strongly dislike’; 10 = ‘strongly like’ (original CES 
variable:  mbsI8a). 
Charest     An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Progressive Conservative 
Party leader, Jean Charest:  0 = ‘strongly dislike’; 10 = ‘strongly like’ (original 
CES variable:  mbsI8b). 
McDonough     An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the New Democratic 
Party leader, Alexa McDonough:  0 = ‘strongly dislike’; 10 = ‘strongly like’ 
(original CES variable:  mbsI8c). 
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Manning     An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Reform Party leader, 
Preston Manning:  0 = ‘strongly dislike’; 10 = ‘strongly like’ (original CES 
variable:  mbsi8d). 
Duceppe     An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Bloc Quebecois Party 
leader, Gilles Duceppe:  0 = ‘strongly dislike’; 10 = ‘strongly like’ (original 
CES variable:  mbsi8e). 
 
Social policy measures 
 
More Immigration     A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of government 
spending for Aboriginal peoples:  1 = ‘less’; 2 = ‘about the same’; 3 = ‘more’ 
(original CES variable:  cpsj10). 
More Aboriginal Aid     A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether Canada 
should admit more immigrants:  1 = ‘fewer immigrants’; 2 = ‘about the same’; 
3 = ‘more immigrants’ (original CES variable:  cpsj18). 
 
Economic policy/conditions measures 
 
Retrospective Finance     A 3-value variable measuring perceived effects of federal 
government policy on the financial situation of the respondent’s household as 
compared with 12 months ago:  1 = ‘better off’; 2 = ‘haven’t made much 
difference’; 3 = ‘worse off’ (original CES variable: cpsc3). 
Prospective Finance     A 3-value variable measuring perceived anticipated financial 
situation of the respondent’s household 12 months from now:  1 = ‘better off’; 
2 = ‘about the same’; 3 = ‘worse of’ (original CES variable: cpsc2). 
 
 
LiberalID, ProgConID, NDPID, RefID, BlocQID     Separate dummy variables for 
measuring the party identification of respondents with the Liberal, Progressive 
Conservative, NDP, Reform or Bloc Quebecois parties.  NOTE:  The inclusion 
of self/party left-right placement measures resulted in dramatic loss of 
respondents.  Party identification measures were included instead to prevent 
this loss of n.  While especially minor party affinities may resist the sort of 
socialized affinities traditionally associated with partisanship, the use of 
partisan measures instead of self/party left-right placements in the 
Australian/New Zealand study yielded fundamentally comparable results.  We 
pursue the issue of the majority of, especially, Reform voters not identifying 
with their partisan choice in the course of the analysis (original CES variable:  
cpsk1). 
 
Demographics 
 
Female     A dummy variable for respondent’s gender:  1 = female; 0 = male (original 
CES variable:  mbsj2). 
Age     A continuous variable for respondent’s age (original CES variable: mbsj1). 
High Education     A dummy variable for respondent’s level of education:  1= some 
college or completion of any college degree; 0 = completed secondary 
education or less 
(original CES variable:  cpsm3). 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 8, No. 1, 2014, 3-26 
 
24 
 
Union Member     A dummy variable for respondent’s/household member’s union 
membership:  1= union member; 0 = not a union member (original CES 
variable: cpsm9). 
EastWest     A dummy variable for respondent residence in ‘the West’:  1= lives in 
Alberta or British Columbia; 0 = lives in any other province or territory 
(original CES variable: province). 
Regionz5   A 5-fold variable specifying 5 regions in Canada:  1 = Atlantic (Prince 
Edward Island, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia); 2 = 
Ontario; 3 = Saskatchewan and Manitoba; 4 = North West Territory and 
Yukon; 5 = Alberta and British Columbia.  Note:  Quebec is excluded from 
this array because Reform did not field candidates in Quebec in 1997; thus the 
CES did not include Reform in its items in Quebec versions of the CES survey 
about Reform vote and party identification.  Original CES variable:  province. 
 
Other social attitudes measures:  (NB:  positive values=conservative stance) 
 
Oppose Minority Rights     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the 
statement that ‘minority groups need special rights’:  1 = ‘strongly agree’; 2 = 
‘agree’; 3 = ‘disagree’; 4 = ‘strongly disagree.’  (original CES variable:  
mbsa14). 
Oppose Bilingualism     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement 
that ‘we have gone too far in pushing bilingualism in Canada’:  4 = ‘strongly 
agree’; 3 = ‘agree’; 2 = ‘disagree’; 1 = ‘strongly disagree.’  (original CES 
variable:  mbsd7). 
Support Grass Roots     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement 
that ‘we could probably solve most of our big national problems if decisions 
could be brought back to the people at the grass roots’:  4 = ‘strongly agree’; 3 
= ‘agree’; 2 = ‘disagree’; 1 = ‘strongly disagree.’ (original CES variable:  
mbsd3). 
Anyone Can Find Work     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the 
statement that ‘if people really want work, they can find a job’:  4 = ‘strongly 
agree’; 3 = ‘agree’; 2 = ‘disagree’; 1 = ‘strongly disagree.’ (original CES 
variable:  mbsa12). 
Oppose Moral Change     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement 
that ‘the world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral 
behaviour to these changes’:  4= ‘strongly disagree’; 3 = ‘disagree’; 2 = 
‘agree’; 1 = ‘strongly agree.’ (original CES variable:  mbsa8). 
Oppose Aboriginal Influence     A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the 
difference between the perceived level of influence aboriginal peoples have 
and the level of influence they should have.  Positive/higher scores reflect the 
respondent feeling aboriginal peoples have more influence than the respondent 
feels they should have.  Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling 
aboriginal peoples should have more influence than they have (original CES 
variables:  mbsc9a and mbsc9b). 
Oppose Minority Influence     A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the difference 
between the perceived level of influence racial minorities have and the level of 
influence they should have.  Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent 
feeling racial minorities have more influence than the respondent feels they 
should have.  Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling racial 
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minorities should have more influence than they have (original CES variables:  
mbsc10a and mbsc10b). 
Oppose Welfare Influence     A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the difference 
between the perceived level of influence people on welfare have and the level 
of influence they should have.  Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent 
feeling people on welfare have more influence than the respondent feels they 
should have.  Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling people on 
welfare should have more influence than they have (original CES variables:  
mbsc11a and mbsc11b). 
Government Wasteful     A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether people 
in government:  3 = ‘waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes’; 2 = ‘waste 
some of it’; or 1 = ‘don’t waste very much of it’ (original CES variable:  
mbsb6). 
Government Crooked     A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether people 
running government are crooked:  3 = ‘quite a few’ are crooked’; 2 = ‘not very 
many are crooked’; 1 = ‘hardly any are crooked’ (original CES variable:  
mbse9). 
Immigrants Must Fit     A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement 
‘too many recent immigrants just don’t want to fit into Canadian society’:  4 = 
‘strongly agree’; 3 = ‘agree’; 2 = ‘disagree’; 1 = ‘strongly disagree.’  (original 
CES variable:  mbsg4). 
No Confidence: Federal Govt     A 4-value variable measuring the level of confidence 
in the federal government: 4 = ‘none at all’; 3 = ‘not very much’; 2 = ‘quite a 
lot’; 1 = ‘a great deal.’  (original CES variable:  mbsf8). 
More Confidence:  Prov’l Govt     A 7-value variable (-3 to +3) measuring the level 
of confidence in the provincial over the federal government:  Positive/higher 
scores reflect the respondent feeling less confidence in the federal government 
than for the provincial government.  Negative/lower scores reflect the 
respondent feeling more confidence in the federal than the provincial 
government (original CES variables:  mbsf8 and mbsf9). 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Data and methods 
 
 This paper uses data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study (CES) (Blais, et al., 
1997).  The CES survey database derives from three surveys examining the 1997 federal 
election:  a campaign period wave rolling cross-section survey (CPS); a post-election cross-
section survey (PES); and a mail back survey (MBS).  The CPS was a computer-assisted 
telephone interview, conducted during the campaign period between the time when the 
election writs were issued and the day before the election.  The PES, conducted using 
computer-assisted telephone interview techniques, commenced on the day following the 
election and was completed in subsequent days.  The mail back survey, containing 
approximately 100 items, was sent to all respondents who consented, upon completion of the 
PES.  Twenty-nine of the items used in this study derive from the mail back survey (See 
Appendix), while seven derive from the campaign period survey and one from the post-
election survey.  All told, the 1997 CES is a large, nationally-representative survey database 
from a critical election focused on populist themes. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
  Nevitte, et al. (1998, p. 176) conclude similarly that, after voting overwhelmingly for the Progressive 
Conservatives in 1984, their failure to be more responsive to regional priorities ‘led many Westerners to 
conclude that, at bottom, both of the country’s major parties were driven by the same dynamic, namely, 
priority to central Canada and special treatment for Quebec at the expense of the West’. 
2
  The Canadian vote model uses party identification measures for each party instead of self/party left-right 
placement measures.  While the traditional Party ID assumption of long-term, socialized attachments to a 
party is problematic in the context of emergent parties, the broader notion of partisan affinity is, we contend, 
valuable and important to tap.  Furthermore, the introduction of party/self left/right placement measures was 
found to be responsible for significant loss of n in the models, due to non-response.  This, likely, reflects the 
fact, as Nevitte, et al. (1998, p. 178) have argued, that left/right and class labels are not used by most 
Canadians to describe themselves.  At the same time, other research has shown that the replication of models 
using party identification instead of left/right placements yielded no appreciable change in the results patterns 
(see Denemark and Bowler, 2002, footnote 8). 
 
3
  We use Alberta and British Columbia as the notional ‘West’ because these two provinces represented 
Reform’s heartland.  See the discussion of Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
4
 The Atlantic region consists of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. 
 
5
  The Multinomial Logistic Regression analysis in this paper (Table 1) reports the independent effect of the 
variables listed – that is, the effect for each factor, controlling for the effects of the other factors in the model.  
The regression coefficients denote the strength of a given factor in prompting a vote for a given party as 
against the Liberal Party (which is the excluded reference in each paired test:  Progressive Conservative in 
column 1; NDP in column 2; Bloc Quebecois in column 3 and Reform in column 4).  Positive signs for a factor’s 
coefficient show that the higher the value of the variable listed, the more likely voters were to vote, for 
example in column 4, Reform and not Liberal.  Negative signs show that the lower the value of the variable 
listed the more likely voters were to vote Reform over Liberal.  Standard errors are reported below the 
regression coefficients.  The ratio of a regression coefficient to its standard error produces the level of 
significance, reported here with asterisks, which are defined in the note below the table.  Key effects for this 
analysis are highlighted.  The Appendix details the coding of all measures used in this paper. 
 
6
  In fact, among those completing the post-election survey, Reform was the only party to gain votes from the 
campaign-period ‘intended vote’ to the post-election vote tally.  Its total rose from 425 to 518 votes, while the 
Liberals lost 26 votes to 811, the Progressive Conservatives lost 21 votes to 415, the NDP lost 1 vote to 277, 
and the Bloc Quebecois lost 10 votes to 235. 
